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ABSTRACT
In threshold schemes one represents each sensitive variable
by a number n of shares such that their (usually) bitwise
sum equals that variable. These shares are initially gener-
ated in such a way that any subset of n − 1 shares gives
no information about the sensitive variable. Functions (S-
boxes, mixing layers, round functions . . . ) are computed on
the shares of the inputs resulting in the output as a number
of shares. An essential property of a threshold implementa-
tion of a function is that each output share is computed from
at most n−1 input shares. This is called incompleteness and
guarantees that that computation cannot leak information
about sensitive variables. The resulting output is then typi-
cally subject to some further computation, again in the form
of separate, incomplete, computation on shares. For these
subsequent computations to not leak information about the
sensitive variables, the output of the previous stage must still
be uniform. Hence, in an iterative cryptographic primitive
such as a block cipher, we need a threshold implementation
of the round function that yields a uniformly shared out-
put if its input is uniformly shared. This property of the
threshold implementation is called uniformity.
Threshold schemes form a good protection mechanism
against differential power analysis (DPA). In particular, us-
ing it allows building cryptographic hardware that is guaran-
teed to be unattackable with first-order DPA, assuming cer-
tain leakage models of the cryptographic hardware at hand
and for a plausible definition of “first order”.
Constructing an incomplete threshold implementation of
a non-linear function is rather straightforward. To offer re-
sistance against first-order DPA, the number of shares equals
the algebraic degree of the function plus one. However, con-
structing one that is at the same time incomplete and uni-
form may present a challenge. For instance, for the Keccak
non-linear layer, incomplete 3-share threshold implementa-
tions are easy to generate but no uniform one is known.
Exhaustive investigations have been performed on all small
S-boxes (3 to 5 bits) and there are many S-boxes for which
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it is not known to build uniform threshold implementations
with d + 1 shares if their algebraic degree is d.
Uniformity of a threshold implementation is essential in its
information-theoretical proof of resistance against first-order
DPA. However, given a non-uniform threshold implementa-
tion, it is not immediate how to exploit its non-uniformity
in an attack.
In my talk I discuss the local and global effects of non-
uniformity in iterated functions and their significance on the
resistance against DPA. I treat methods to quantitatively
limit the amount of non-uniformity and to keep it away from
where it may be harmful. These techniques are relatively
cheap and can reduce non-uniformity to such a low level
that it would require an astronomical amount of samples to
measure it.
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